Mobile health technology has great potential to increase healthcare quality, expand access to services, reduce costs, and improve personal wellness and public health. However, mHealth also raises significant privacy and security challenges.
› The locus of care is shifting as the healthcare system seeks more efficient and less expensive ways to care for patients, particularly outpatients with chronic conditions.
› Strong economic incentives
to keep patient populations healthy, rather than caring for patients only when ill, are motivating healthcare providers to pursue innovative prevention plans and treatments of chronic conditions that entail more continuous patient monitoring outside of the clinical setting.
› Mobile consumer devices
like smartphones and tablets are quickly being adopted by patients, caregivers, and healthcare providers for health and wellness applications in addition to their many other uses, making it difficult to protect sensitive health-related data and functions from the risks posed by general-purpose devices connected to the Internet. › Significant emerging threats target health IT systems, while new regulations strive to protect medical integrity and patient privacy.
› Rapid technology advances that
enhance mobile devices' utilityfor example, computational models that convert wearablesensor data into measures of addictive behaviors such as cocaine use or smokingincrease the range of potentially private events that can be inferred from seemingly innocuous sensor data.
› Healthcare organizations lack the technology and expertise to adequately secure patient data; according to a recent survey, 69 percent of clinicians said their organization did not address demonstrated cyber vulnerabilities in medical devices approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 8 These trends are driving major changes in the health IT landscape, and require research to develop effective security technologies that work across care settings and support continuous data collection in the context of multipurpose mobile devices.
Before exploring the challenges in detail, we first define our scope. Traditional approaches to securing healthcare systems have relied on isolation, using tools like firewalls and network access control. However, the trends MOBILE HEALTH: DEFINITION AND CATEGORIES I n this article, mobile health, or mHealth, refers to the use of mobile technologies-wearable, implantable, environmental, or portable-by individuals who monitor or manage their own health, perhaps with the assistance of individual caregivers or provider organizations. The technology might support clinical care-including diagnosis and disease management-or wellness goals such as losing weight, eating a healthy diet, quitting smoking, or becoming physically fit.
Our definition of mHealth includes four general categories:
» Physiological monitoring: measuring, recording, and reporting physiological parameters such as heart rate and blood pressure. » Activity and behavior monitoring: measuring, recording, and reporting movement and physical and social activity as well as health-related behaviors such as eating and addictive behaviors. » Information access: accessing health-related data-for example, medical records, activity, or behavior data-and decision-support tools. » Telemedicine: communication between patients and caregivers and/or providers-for example, a virtual doctor visit or a patient receiving personal encouragement from a caregiver support team.
described above make it unfeasible to simply "lock down" medical devices or health-records systems, especially because patients and staff use part of the system outside the clinical context and many of the wellness applications of this technology are entirely nonclinical. Instead, these trends demand "wide-spectrum" security technologies that can be adjusted to fit the system user's needs and expertise. A major healthcare provider has professional staff that can configure and monitor security settings in its electronic medical record (EMR) database, but an individual patient must have intuitive and hassle-free security technologies for home-based devices. Given this scope-mHealth technology used by individuals who might be supported by caregivers and providers, perhaps remotely-we can specify numerous open research challenges that span technology, policy, and organizational domains.
DATA SHARING AND CONSENT MANAGEMENT
Most mHealth systems collect data about a person's physiology, physical activity, or social behavior and are designed to store the data for later analysis by caregivers and providers. Data sharing raises the question of consent: how and when does the person decide whether, and with whom, to share what data and at what level of granularity?
In the traditional health information management model, patients consent to the collection and use of their personal health information (PHI) for treatment purposes. 
ACCESS CONTROL AND AUTHENTICATION
User consent or policy determines who can access mHealth data, but how do mHealth systems confidently identify the individual(s) they are sensing or who is using the system? Identification is critical to attach the correct identity to the mHealth data for provenance, and authentication is the foundation of access control and audit logging.
Many of today's mHealth apps are based on a smartphone, leveraging its sensors and user interface to collect, process, and report healthrelated information about the device's owner. As smartphones are designed as personal devices, it is normally safe to assume that the user is indeed the owner. Of course, a smartphone can be stolen or borrowed by another person, resulting in the phone's mHealth apps recording data about the wrong person to the owner's health record or exposing the owner's PHI via app displays and notifications. It is thus important for a smartphone to know when it is not in the owner's possession. Most work on this problem focuses on initial authentication to unlock the user interface (most commonly via numeric codes, swipe patterns, or fingerprints), but there is a real need for continuous authentication-that is, repeatedly verifying that the phone's holder is the person who initially authenticated.
Many future mHealth apps will use wearable devices to measure activity, behavior, and physiology and even to directly influence the body. Such devices must be able to verify the wearer's identity to ensure that the collected data is posted to the correct health record and that any treatment applied is truly intended for the wearer. One solution is to build biometric sensing into the device, such as the bioimpedance approach taken by Cory Cornelius and his colleagues. Furthermore, any method for identifying and authenticating smartphone or wearable device users for mHealth apps must be accurate, applicable to most persons, robust to environmental conditions, unobtrusive, and resistant to various attacks. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY
Much of the information-whether physiological, behavioral, or socialcollected by mHealth systems is sensitive and highly personal. The data must remain confidential, subject to access-control policies and mechanisms, and anonymous when used for research and public-health purposes where individual identities are not necessary.
Anonymization
Mobile-sensor data provides researchers with unprecedented opportunities to quantify the complex temporal dynamics of key physical, biological, behavioral, psychological, social, and environmental factors that contribute to disease. For example, GPS data makes it possible to collect geo-exposures (such as proximity to a tobacco point of sale for a newly abstinent smoker or to a fast-food restaurant for a congestive heart-failure patient) and movement patterns (such as driving or physical activity), and to study their impact on health.
However, mobile-sensor data can also disclose private information about the user. For example, GPS data can reveal not only the user's identity but also all the places the user has visited, some of which might be private. Even if GPS is turned off, data collected by the accelerometers and gyroscopes embedded in smartphones and smartwatches for activity monitoring could be used to characterize a person's movement patterns.
Sharing raw mobile-sensor data thus carries re-identification risks. Sharing only high-level inferencesfor example, begin/end times at home or work-from the data might limit such risks but also significantly limits the data's utility.
Research challenge: understand and quantify re-identification risks inherent in various mobile sensors, and develop data-transformation methods to limit such risks while retaining scientific utility.

Behavioral privacy
Measurements from mobile devices and wearable sensors can provide unique visibility into a user's health status, stress, addictive behavior, eating patterns, sedentary behavior, geo-exposures, and daily social interactions. Such data can help researchers better understand the etiology of complex human diseases responsible for more than half of all US deaths. However, sharing this data also poses new privacy challenges. For example, audio data can reveal conversational and emotional characteristics, exposure to TV programming and advertisements, and video game playing and other activities, but it can also capture private and intimate details.
There is a need for technologies that mitigate the risks of behavioral privacy disclosure while also supporting the health or wellness goals for which the data is collected. For example, realtime audio processing could be used to extract relevant health inferences while discarding sensitive content but would necessitate improved algorithms. Likewise, breathing patterns could be used to infer conversation episodes 10 
mHEALTH SMARTPHONE APPS
Many mHealth benefits will be delivered to users, caregivers, and providers through smartphone apps. These apps might › use the phone's sensors to record sounds, take photos, or record motion;
› communicate with other sensor devices worn on the skin or collect health-related information from nearby sensors that, for example, sense contaminants in the air; or › collect data from the user's EMR in a hospital or from a cloud repository.
This wide range of possibilities has aroused concerns about the techniques used to secure mobile devices and mHealth apps. Much of the smartphone app market lies outside government regulation, although the FDA and Federal Trade Commission have started to address these concerns in the US. The quality of implemented security measures varies widely.
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Some recommendations are available for mHealth app developers, and mobile device management (MDM) solutions can help clinical enterprises secure smartphones and tablets. There is also a promising proposal to develop a "building code" for safety-critical medical systems. 3 
Research challenge: develop best practices for securing mobile devices and their apps, and develop platforms that will provide these benefits at low cost.
Current smartphone app architectures also raise privacy concerns. In particular, the Android platform, which makes up 80 percent of the smartphone OS market, has a degree of openness that supports strong innovation but also puts users at risk of privacy violations. These concerns arise from two aspects of the Android architecture. First, the degree of information flow between apps is worrisome because the wide range of apps likely to populate the average user's smartphone creates a possibility that at least one app will gather information about other apps on the device and use it in ways the user might not approve of. Second, apps commonly incorporate advertising libraries, which means they effectively share their privileges with advertisers, weakening the "least privilege" principle and opening the threat of privacy leakage via advertising libraries. 12 Research challenge: clarify threats to, and develop security and privacy protections for, smartphone apps that handle medical and health data-in particular, develop methods to isolate apps from advertisers.
POLICIES AND COMPLIANCE
Access to mHealth systems and the information they provide is typically managed by policies, which might emanate from consumers (as when they indicate data-use preferences), the operating procedures of healthcare providers or technology organizations, or government regulations. Policy development and enforcement results from a complex interplay of multiple stakeholders. Because technology is essential to help monitor and enforce these policies, policymakers must understand the wide and evolving range of relevant technologies.
Research challenge: What technical mechanisms could enforce data-management policies as mHealth data is collected, stored, processed, and shared? Could technologies developed for digital rights management (DRM) assist in ensuring that an individual's personal privacy preferences remain attached to data about them, and that these preferences are enforced even as the data is stored and forwarded to providers and other healthcare system participants?
To realize the promise of mHealth devices and applications, everyone involved-from patients to providers to payers-must trust the system to provide high-integrity data and services while respecting users' privacy. This trust is partly based on mechanisms built into the technology, including cryptographic protections on data at rest and in transit, access-control policies, and authentication mechanisms. Ultimately, though, trust resides in the people and organizations manufacturing and distributing devices, developing software, operat ing services, and using the data. The trust relationships among these actors, and the legal and regulatory frame works that support those relationships, are a critical foundation for the techno logical mechanisms. A conceptual mapping would provide a clean abstraction for reasoning about the security and privacy properties of mHealth systems, and could guide cre ation of a regulatory framework in the real world. The World Health Organi zation recently reviewed key aspects of the current state of this regulatory framework across the globe. 13 The framework, while progressing rapidly, is still in the earliest stages of develop ment in most nations. 
ACCURACY AND DATA PROVENANCE
For mHealth systems to achieve their full potential-improving healthcare, reducing costs, and expanding accessthose receiving information produced by these systems must be able to trust their accuracy and veracity. In addition to the threats posed by common cyberattacks, the physical coupling of sensors and actuators make them vulnerable to attacks mounted from the physical channel, such as sig nal manipulation. To protect not only data but system inferences and deci sions, solutions to such attacks must go beyond traditional cryptographic mechanisms and employ novel tech niques from control theory, game the ory, and other disciplines.
In our conversations with phy sicians and researchers, one of the most frequently cited concerns about mHealth data collected outside the clinical setting relates to the data's authenticity and accuracy. The data must be tagged with information about the data's provenance-what device collected the data and what was done to the data-as well as the context in which it was collected. This metadata must be securely bound to the data with a combination of crypto graphic hashes and signatures to ensure that neither the data nor meta data has been tampered with.
Such methods might be feasible in simple situations where a sensing device is uploading raw data directly to the recipient's healthdata server. In many advanced applications, how ever, the data passes through multiple stages of processing including filter ing, summarization, aggregation, and combination with other data sources. What is the best way to convey infor mation about all these data sources and processing steps?
Contextual information is even more difficult to define and collect because it often depends on the type of health data being collected. For a bloodpressure reading, for example, it is important to know whether the subject applied the cuff correctly to her arm, rested her arm on a flat sur face, and remained still throughout the reading. Aarathi Prasad and her colleagues proposed one approach to the specification and collection of contextual evidence for mHealth sen sor data, 14 but much more needs to be done to recognize the many factors that affect the quality of such data. Homomorphic encryption enables cloud-based servers to store and process sensitive mHealth data without those servers or their operators ever handling the unencrypted information, allowing mobile and wearable device users to leverage the power of cloud computing without needing to trust cloud services with this confidential data. 16 Many mHealth technologies produce a large, long-term stream of data about a person's health and healthrelated behaviors that, if aggregated, presents a huge opportunity for public health research. Imagine, for example, the potential benefits of tracking a million-subject cohort for a decade or longer, as envisioned by President Obama's Precision Medicine Initiative (w w w.nih.gov/precision-medicine -initiative-cohort-program). The challenge is providing researchers with scientifically robust data from such a dataset without exposing individuals' private information. Emerging differential privacy methods have great promise to achieve this dual vision. 17 Research challenge: develop efficient homomorphic encryption techniques for mHealth data, and limit the amount of noise that must be added to data to satisfy differential privacy requirements.
T
he increasing capability and decreasing size of mobile technology offers many opportunities to improve health and wellness. The same technology, however, could cause users harm if the hardware and software systems are not designed with security and privacy in mind. The research community has an important role to play in developing effective, efficient, and usable mechanisms to secure mHealth technology and protect users' PHI. To that end, we encourage our colleagues to address the many research challenges outlined in this article. 
